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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

BETTY P. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver
License Division, Department of Public Safety, State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13981

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license
revocation by the appellant under Utah Implied Consent
Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION BELOW
On June 14,1974, appellant revoked the respondent's
driver's license for the latter's alleged failure to submit
to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
(1953), as amended, said revocation to be for one year.
Pursuant to the provisions of said act, respondent,
through her attorney, Richard J. Maughan, filed a complaint and petition June 21, 1974, requesting a de novo
hearing and further requesting a restoration of license
pending appeal. Thereafter, new counsel, D. Gilbert
Athay for the respondent, and counsel for the appellant,
presented the matter at trial on the 5th day of December, 1974, before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall. Judge
Hall found that the respondent did not unreasonably
refuse to submit to a sobriety test. Consequently, Judge
Hall ruled that the petition of the respondent to set
aside the revocation .under administrative hearing be
granted and that the respondent be ordered reinstated
to her driving privileges.
The order of the Third District Court Judge Gordon
R. Hall was entered January 14, 1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
of January 14, 1975, ordering the restoration of the respondent's driver's license and seeks an order in accord
with appellant's prior administrative revocation.
Respondent would have this court affirm the lower
court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 16th day of April, 1974, Trooper Clint Hendry
of the Utah State Highway Patrol observed respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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while driving a vehicle southbound on a two-lane highway in the vicinity of 3500 South Redwood Road at
approximately 2:30 o'clock a.m. Due to his observation
the trooper stopped the vehicle and later determined
it to be driven by the respondent. After investigation
and observation of the respondent, the trooper decided
that the respondent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and placed her under arrest at approximately
2:40 a'clock a.m. The respondent was advised of her
constitutional rights as well as her rights under the
Utah's Implied Consent Law, the same having been given
to her by Trooper Hendry, and respondent indicated she
understood said rights (R. 22-25).
The respondent indicated at the scene that she would
like to talk to her attorney (R. 25, line 26). At the jail,
the respondent called Mr. Richard Maughan, her attorney, which call occurred approximately 3:25 or 3:30
o'clock a.m. Trooper Hendry also spoke to Mr. Maughan
and upon being asked what advice he was giving Mrs.
Peterson with respect to the chemical test, Trooper
Hendry was advised by attorney Maughan that he
though he had better jump into some clothes and run on
down and have a little chat with the respondent. Trooper
Hendry agreed to that. Trooper Hendry advised Mrs.
Peterson, the respondent, of her rights on more than two
occasions, two of which were at the jail (R. 27). The
respondent was offered either a blood test or a breath
test, to which the respondent said "I don't want to take
any tests until my attorney was present (R. 27, line
27-28). See also (R. 43). Trooper Hendry was prepared
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to administer a breath test and was a qualified operator
of the breathalyzer. If required, persons were available
for a blood test (R. 28). Attorney Don Sawaya of the
county attorney's office was also present (R. 28). The
respondent and Trooper Hendry waited approximately
45 minutes, after which time contact was made by phone
to Mr. Maughan's residence and respondent was advised
and she advised the officer that Mr. Maughan should be
at the jail within five minutes or so. Trooper Hendry
waited by his record approximately 15 minutes longer
mid then left the jail when Mr. Maughan had not appeared (R. 29).
Trooper Hendry advised the respondent "that I
could not wait any longer time since the driving
that occurred had been two hours. I had been at the
jail since 3:10 a.m., it was now 4:30; and I asked her
(Mrs. Peterson) one more time if she would take a
chemical test for us, either a Wood test or a breath test,
and explained the consequences of refusing to take the
test" (R. 29, lines 14-19). The respondent indicated
she did not want to take any test without her attorney
present (R. 29, lines 23 and 23, R. 31, R. 38, lines 5 and
6). Respondent disputes that 15 additional minutes were
waited, alleging maybe 10 minutes is all that elapsed.
Trooper Hendry left the jail and went to the parking
lot of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, where he waited
approximately 15 minutes while compiling his reports
(R. 31, 32). Trooper Hendry informed no one at the
jail that he would be waiting in the parking lot, that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not being his customary procedure. Within approximately
five minutes after Trooper Hendry left the jail, Mr.
Richard Maughan, the attorney for respondent, arrived
at the jail to converse with respondent (R. 45).
Upon cross-examination, Trooper Hendry stated that
the respondent had an opportunity to talk to her lawyer
(R. 34, lines 8-9). Trooper Hendry was not advised at
any time that Mr. Maughan had arrived at the jail (R.
38, lines 22-24). Trooper Hendry did advise respondent
that if she did not take the test he would file a refusal
and she indicated she did not want to take any tests
without her attorney present (R. 29). Trooper Hendry
found the attorney not coming by 4:30 a.m. noteworthy
as follows:
"I thought it was a bit unusual — what
struck me unusual about it was that he hadn't
cared to advise his client on the phone, which
is a common practice, and that he had insisted
on coming down and then that an hour had
transpired and he hadn't appeared. That struck
me as unusual, yes" (R. 39, lines 11-16).
The respondent agrees that the time between the
first and the second call was probably 45 minutes (R.
44, lines 27-28). The respondent agreed that there was
no requesit from either herself or attorney Maughan to
any of the jailer personnel to have Trooper Hendry return to the jail (R. 46, 47). Respondent and her attorney
left immediately on her own rewgnizanee not more than
fifteen or twenty minutes later (R. 46, line 22).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial court held that respondent had a right
to contact counsel prior to deciding whether to take the
offered chemical test under the Implied Consent Law.
Further, that respondent's conduct under the above set
of facts did not constitute a refusal to submit to a chemical test of her blood or breath such as would warrant
the suspension of her driver's license.
Thereafter, the court held that the petition of respondent should be granted and that the revocation of
June 7, 1974, should be rescinded and respondent's driving privileges reinstated.
BACKGROUND
In hope of curbing the tremendousc increase in accidents and deaths and to help overcome many of the
difficulties in proving the fact of drinking and driving,
the legislatures of many states, including Utah, have
enacted Implied Consent Laws requiring persons licensed
to drive to submit to a chemical analysis of their breath,
blood or urine to determine if they are driving under the
influence of alcohol or some drug. These laws uniformly
hold that the refusal to submit to such a test while yet
a licensed driver are grounds for the revocation of the
driving privilege.
In summary, courts view the Implied Consent Law
as a means (1) of assisting the court in ascertaining the
truth of the charge that the defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, by encouraging
the defendant to take a chemical test to determine the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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condition of his blood. Scientific evidence thus obtained
provides an objective evaluation. This evaluation achieves
additional benefits (a) to help xhe public and protect
them by removing drunk drivers from the highway, (b)
helps innocent parsons who may have the odor of alcohol
on their breath but have not been drinking to excess but
whose conduct may create the appearance of intoxication
when the driver may be suffering from some other physical condition that gives such impression, and further
(c) helps provide information on the causes of accidents
which is important in the development of a successful
accident prevention program.
In each Implied Consent case, basic requisites must
apply. These include (a) probable cause to consider the
driver to be intoxicated, (b) an arrest, (c) a designation
by the peace officer within reason of the test to be administered, (d) the refusal either express or implied is
communicated to or within reason presumed by the peace
officer. The relevant wording of Utah Code Ann. § 416-44.10 (1953), as amended, is as follows:
"(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test of his breath or
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided that such
test is administered at the direction of a peace
officer having reasonable grounds to believe
such person to have been driving in an intoxicated condition. The arresting officer shall determine within reason which of the aforesaid
tests shall be administered . . . (c) If such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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person has been placed under arrest and has
thereafter been requested to submit to any one
of the chemical tests, provided for in subsections (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not
be given and the arresting officer shall advise
the person of his rights under this section."
ARGUMENT
POINT L
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT TO
A REQUIRED CHEMICAL TEST UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), AS
AMENDED, UNTIL A PERSONAL CONFERENCE WITH HER ATTORNEY AT
T H E J A I L , IS NOT A "REASONABLE
CAUSE" NOT TO SUBMIT, IF THE TIME
OF PERSONAL CONFERENCE IS SO FAR
REMOVED AS TO RENDER POTENTIALLY OBTAINABLE TEST RESULTS MEANINGLESS.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not
specifically ruled on the question of how much time may
elapse before it is too late to obtain chemical test results
or how long a peace officer must wait, that is to say
what is a reasonable length of time to wait, under the
circumstances generally, before there is "unecessary delay," or before any results obtainable may be meaningless.
In the case at bar, a real issue is whether Trooper
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hendry was reasonable or unreasonable in failing to
wait beyond an hour from the time that attorney Richard
Maughan said he would come to the jail. The respondent could argue, of course, that she was following her
attorney's advice in waiting until he arrived before
submitting to a test. This procedure, without parameters
as to time, carried to its logical conclusion could make
the villain of an attorney, not the one arrested, and the
one with the duty of decision, the respondent, and
the results that would flow from such a decision
would be totally opposite from the purpose intended by
the legislature in creating the Implied Consent Law.
(A) Time Factor.
Funke v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1969), holds that
it is common knowledge that time lapse between ingestion of alcohol and blood tests effects accuracy of test
results.
A recent Oregon case, decided December 9, 1974,
Cavagnaro v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of
Transportation, Or. App., 521 P. 2d 1090 (1974), held
that evidence showing that motorist refused to take
breathalyzer test, until he talked to an attorney, and
that the peace officer allowed 15 minutes to contact the
attorney and waited twice that long during which period
motorist was unable to reach attorney and then advised
motorist of his rights, that the officer then turned off
his machine, and the motorist 15 minutes later reached
his attorney and said he would take the test; that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officer's declining to administer the test over two hours
after the motorist's arrest, all failed to support the judgment of the lower trial court vacating suspension of the
motorist's driver's license by the Department of Transporation for refusal to take a breathalyzer test, and the
court reversed the trial court, holding it a refusal. In
that case the court quotes a previous Oregon decision,
Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4 Or. App.
313, 477 P. 2d 237 (1970), 478 P. 2d 654, Supreme Court
review denied 1971, where the court in quoting a New
Jersey case of 1970, State v. Pandoli, 109 N. J. Super.
1, 262 A. 2d 41 (1970), where the driver contended that
there was no flat refusal to take the test where he refused to take the test until he had an opportunity to call
his attorney; the Oregon Court approves the language
of the New Jersey Court quoted as follows:
" 'In any event, the request for consultation with counsel necessarily involved a delay
in the administration of the test. Having in
mind the remedial purpose of the statute, and
the rapidity with which the passage of time and
the psychological processes tend to eliminate
evidence of ingested alcohol in the system,, it
is sensible to construe the statute to mean that
anything substantially short of an unqualified,
unequivocal assent to an officer's request that
the arrested motorist take the test constitutes
a refusal to do so.'"
The court then cites another Oregon case elsewhere re*
ferred to in the brief Johnson v. Department of Motor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Vehicles, 5 Or. App. 617, 485 P. 2d 1258 (1971), as supportive/
The Oregon Court concludes in the Cavagnaro case
as follows:
"We conclude that as a matter of law, the
voluntary postponement for a specified period of
time of the administration of a breathalyzer
test by a police officer to enable the driver to
contact an attorney does not itself constitute
the waiver of a valid previous demand to take
the test beyond the time allowed by the officer."
Id. at 1092.
This should be the rule of law in the case at bar. The
fact that two hours had elapsed from time of arrest
would control. The officer had not abandoned his previous requests, when he advised the respondent at 4:30
a.m. that he wanted her to express if she would take
the test before he left.
An analysis of the Hunter case does indicate that
the delay was over an hour within which time Dr. Hunter,
after refusing consistently, then said that he would take
a blood test and the officer refused, saying it was too
late. By distinction, in this case, the reasonable time
lapsed, in the officer's opinion, before the attorney c^me.
Certainly, the courts should not be placed in the
position to ratify without some parameters of reasonableness some time frame that would control; otherwise,
attorneys could with impunity, advise clients in similar
circumstances not to take the test or to wait until the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ajttorney came to the jail, whether in fact this did or did
not occur, which would require peace officers to wait
before booking procedures for extended periods of time,
unduly burdening their work schedules, not knowing for
sure whether the attorney will or will not come, and all
the while any measureable quantitative test and its use
or validity thereby diminishing to the point of non-value.
Appellant submits that based upon the facts at trial,
the evidence clearly shows that the failure to submit to
the requested chemical test on the part of the respondent, an hour from the time of consultation on the phone
with her attorney and at that point of time two hours
beyond the time of arrest, was unreasonable.
If there was any confusion in respondent's mind as
to whether she should proceed to take the test or stand
the consequences of losing her license for a year, that
confusion was created by counsel and not by the peace
officer. Subsequent advice of Trooper Hendry was clear
that so much time had elapsed that she would then have
to make a decision on her own as to whether she would
take the test or not, and if she failed to take the test
at that point in time, he would have to count it as a refusal, as he was required to leave. (Emphasis ours.)
Trooper Hendry had been patient, cooperative and
without arbitrariness.
The failure on the part of the respondent or her
counsel to request Officer Hendry's return, if the attorney's arrival was so close as to cause the suggestion that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trooper Hendry was impatient, then again it was the
responsibility of respondent and/or her counsel or both
to ask for a test and make some reasonable request to get
the same if they did not want to suffer the consequences
of the submission of a refusal affidavit to the state, a
hearing thereon, and the subsequent revocation as did
occur in this case prior to trial de novo.
(B) Public Interest.
An Oregon decision sets forth the balance that
must be given weight between public's interest and that
of the driver. In a decision rendered August 25, 1972,
the Court in Kauffman v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Transportation, Or. App. 1*72, 500 P. 2d
475, in a case where the driver blew into the breathalyzer
which was not functioning propertly and thereafter refused to blow a second time at the request of the officer,
subsequent to his attorney then advising the driver not
to blow a second time and as a result the driver refusing
to do so, from which of course no reading was obtained
from the breathalyzer, the Court said:
"Petitioner was not prejudiced by the officer's error. Upon its prompt discovery, he was
asked to breath into the machine a second time.
There is no contention that the machine was
not in proper operating order or that the unmeasured first blow could have effected the
correct measurement of the one he refused.
Therefore, since the policy of the statute to remove drunk drivers from the highway outweighs
any possible prejudice which the second attempted test would have caused the petitioner,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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we conclude that the petitioner as a matter of
law was not justified or excused in refusing to
submit to the breathalyzer test a second time/'
The court reversed the trial finding.
The same public policy exists in Utah as enunciated
by the Oregon court that the policy of the Implied Consent Law to attempt to remove drunk drivers from the
road has a higher priority and the law should be upheld,
not rendered meaningless, as is the attempt here.
Therefore as to the question should a license be revoked
for a refusal under the fact situation presented, the answer is dearly yes. It can only be condxided under the
facts before the court that if there was probable cause,
and if the driver was arrested, and if the person was
properly advised of her rights, and if the driver was given
an opportunity to consult with an attorney, and if the
driver failed to submit within a reasonable time to a
chemical test with or without the presence of her attorney, it is dearly a refusal.
The fact that the officer agreed at first to the appearance of counsel does not negate the fact that a request for a test was made prior to that point in time
and both respondent and counsel knew it. This acquiesence does not, as a voluntary postponement, act as a
waiver on the part of the officer of a valid previous demand to take the test, and when approximately two
hours had elapsed from the time of arrest, it should be
concluded as a matter of law respondent's failure to
submit is a refusal. (Emphasis ours.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED AT LAW THAT THE
HUNTER V. DORIUS CASE, SUPRA, HOLDING A "RIGHT TO CONSULT LEGAL
COUNSEL" INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO
HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT PRIOR TO
SUBMISSION TO A TEST,
The Utah Implied Consent Law could be rendered
meaningless if the court were to let stand the proposition
that an attorney could be present before a chemical test
under the Implied Consent Law could be administered
and the attorney, for whatever reason, failed to show up
at the jail for an hour or two hours or for an extended
period of time, whatever it may be, and that by virtue
of said time lapse would negate the results of any chemical test then to be administered.
This question of right to consult an attorney, or
the right to have an attorney present at a jail before
one, in the position of the respondent, were to make a
decision to either take or not take a requested chemical
test is one of many constitutional issues that have been
raised over the years in respect to the Implied Consent
Law. In summary, as to constitutional issues in general,
case law has established that the Implied Consent type
law does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, nor is an unreasonable search and seizure involved,
and it meets the requirements of due process of law. It
is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law nor does
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Implied Consent Law breach the equal protection
laws. It does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or freedom of speech.
In speaking to the question of right to counsel, see
the case of Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicle, July
1968, 264 A. C. A. 441, 70 Cal. Rp.tr. 595, Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 936, 71 Cal.
Rpitr. 726, sets forth the general rule of most jurisdictions:
"Neither the denial of the opportunity for
advice of counsel before stating whether one will
submit to a test and before deciding which test
to take, nor the denial of the opportunity to
have counsel present while the test is administered, is the denial of any constitutional right."
The Court quoted the above declaration in Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra. In the Ent case, ihe
court concluded by citing United States v. Wade, 388
U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), as
further authority that no right to counsel attached.
In States that hold a minority position, of which
Utah is apparently one, the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Gursey, 22 N. Y. 2d 224, 292 N. Y. S. 2d 416,
239 N. E. 2d 351, 352-53 (1968), wisely stated:
"The privilege of consulting with counsel
concecraiing the exercise of legal rights should not,
however, extend so far as to palpably impair or
nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers
to choose between taking the test or losing their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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licenses. It is common knowledge that the human body dissipates alcohol rapidly and, indeed,
tinder subdivision 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, test results are admissible
in evidence only if the test had been taken within two hours of the time of arrest. Where the
defendant wishes only to telephone his lawyer
or consult with a lawyer present in the station
house or immediately available there, no danger
of delay is posed. But to be sure, there can be
no recognition of an absolute right to refuse the
test until a lawyer reaches the scene (see Matter
of Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N. Y. 2d 58, 61, 226
N. Y. S. 2d 403, 181 N. E. 2d 427, 429) . . . If
the lawyer is not physically present and cannot
be readied promptly by telephone or otherwise,
the defendant may be required to elect between
taking the test and submitting to revocation of
his license, without the aid of counsel."
Certainly the fair import of the Gursey case is that
a driver could consult with his attorney if he was present
or could be reached promptly by phone before submitting
to a test, but that there was no absolute right to refuse
until an attorney was reached if the attorney was not
immediately available. See Appendix A for additional
cases in this area. (Emphasis ours.)
New York, which like Utah holds that a driver in
these drcumstances should have the privilege of consulting with an attorney concerning the exercise of legal
rights, nevertheless is clear to point out that this privilege or right, should not "extend so far as to . . . impair
or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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choose between taking the test or losing their licenses
. . ." and that there are times when ". . . the defendant
may be required to elect. . . without the aid of counsel/'
People v. Gursey, Id. This case on appeal is such a case.
In contrast to the New York Vehicle law, Utah has
no rule that test results are admissible only if the test
has been taken within two hours of the time of arrest.
There are other states in addition to New York who do
have such a rule.
Within this jurisdiction, we have the holding of the
Hunter v. Dorius, case, supra, stating at page 124, 23
Utah 2d 122, as follows:
"After the plaintiff had been advised as to
his rights under the statute and the consequences of his refusal to submit to a test at the
hour of 9:48 p.m., the plaintiff still had a reasonable time in which to make up his mind and
seek legal counsel."
Just prior to that statement the Court further
stated:
"It is conceded by the defendant that the
plaintiff had a right to consult legal counsel
before making a decision to take or decline the
test." (Emphasis ours.)
The court does not amplify whether this right to
legal counsel existed as a result of the concession thereof
by the defendant or defendant's counsel. It was agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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able to the officer in the Hunter case that an attorney
be called as is the situation before the court in the case
at bar. The question is whether that right is an absolute
right as some would argue the Hunter case stands for
or whether there is a distinction between right of consultation, and right to have the attorney present. (Emphasis ours.)
In the Hunter v. Dorius, case, it specifically states
that a driver had a right to consult legal counsel before
making a decision to take or decline the test. The respondent in the case at bar had such an opportunity
and did in fact consult with the attorney on the phone.
The Hunter case does not stand for the proposition that
the respondent in a case such as before the court, has a
right to the personal presence of her attorney at the jail
prior to submitting to such a test. The attorney could
have given respondent any necessary advice on the telephone. Such advice was so given Dr. Hunter in the
Hunter v. Dorius, case.
Drivers on the highways of Utah are presumed to
know the law. A peace officer such as Trooper Hendry
has the duty to advise said parties so arrested of their
rights. One lawfully arrested, properly advised of his
rights, thereafter refusing or failing to take the chemical
test as denoted by the officer within reason, must determine whether to take or not take the test and stand
the risk of losing his privilege to drive for one year if
he so fails to take the test without reasonable cause.
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Appellant avers that the trial court, in holding respondent's conduct did not constitute a refusal is attempting
to draw some distinction and hold that right to confer
with an attorney means the right to wait until he was
present before submitting to the test. (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of Oregon, 485 P. 2d 1285, the arrested
driver was unable to reach his attorney but his daughter
got ahold of an attorney who tliereafter advised the
driver to take a breathalyzer when he got there (meaning the jail). The attorney did not arrive at the jail
prior to the officer leaving and filing a refusal affidavit.
The trial court, as in the case at bar, held that the driver's failure to take a test did not constitute a refusal
under the drcumstances. The appellate court said that
any erroneous impression upon which the driver relied
in failing to take the breathalyzer, was created by his
counsel, not by the police, and the appellate court reversed the trial court. Appellant suggests this case is
closely on point.
POINT III.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
According to the record, the evidence and the findings of fact are not in dispute except as to one small
point: that is, as to whether or not Trooper Hendry
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waited approximately 15 minutes after the second phone
call at 4:15 o'clock a.m. prior to leaving the jail at approximately 4:30 a.m. or whether it was five to ten minutes as set forth in the Statement of Pacts (R. 11, 12,
13), to which appellant takes issue.
The last sole question, therefore, to be determined
is: Did the trial court piroperly conclude as a matter
of law that the respondent consented to take the sobriety
test?
Since the state of the record of the findings of fact
are as above stated,, the comment of Mr. Justice EUetit
in his dissenting opinion in Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969), applies and appellant
quotes:
"The sole question to be determined is: Did
the trial court properly conclude as a matter of
law that the plaintiff consented to take a sobriety test? Since the evidence is not in dispute,
the trial court is in no better position to rule
upon the matter than is this court."
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the
time from arrest at 2:40 o'clock a.m. to the time approximately Mr. Maughan arrived at the jail was two hours,
the attorney's arrival being beyond dispute at 4:35 or
4:40 o'clock a.m. It is further uncontested that after
the arrival of counsel, no request was made of any jail
personnel nor was any attempt made to have Trooper
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Hendry return to the jail with Mr. Maughan's arrival
being so shortly after the officer's departure.
The evidence is further unrebutted that the respondent was aware of the officer's concern, that it would
be beyond two hours before any test could be administered from the time of the arrest and well beyond two
hours from the time of first stopping the respondent
and considerably longer than that from the time that
any alcoholic beverages were consumed by respondent,
which fact was clearly admitted by respondent (R. 47).
Such drinks bad occurred at home before going to eat
(R. 47). Respondent asked to consult with a lawyer.
That was permitted. Se did talk to the attorney from
the jail (emphasis ours) and he advised both Trooper
Hendry and respondent that he was coming to the jail.
The officer waited an additional hour, informed respondent that he could not wait any longer, told her the
consequences of her failure to make a decision to take
a test prior to his leaving, gave her her rights again, and
yet respondent consistently said that she would do nothing until her attorney arrived. When her attorney arrived, neither respondent nor attorney indicated to any
of the jail personnel that she would take a test or wanted
to take a test of any kind nor did they communicate with
the arresiting officer who appellant alleges reasonable
men could assume would still be in his vehicle either
checking out or on his way home within the time period
alleged had elapsed of not more than 15 minutes befloate
respondent left the jail herself.
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The evidence in the case before us shows that the
delay ocasioned, waiting for counsel to come to the jail,
was unreasonable and was not justified, especially where
respondent had an opportunity to talk to and consult
with the attorney on the phone.
Respondent was properly advised as to the consequences of her refusal to take a test. If respondent,
after notice by the officer that he had to leave and could
not wait longer, in the performance of his duties, chose
to wait further until counsel would arrive, it being in
the opinion of the officer that sufficient time had elapsed,
to permit said arrival, then the consequences of failing
to take the test prior to Trooper Hendry's leaving the
jail is a consequence, adverse though the results may
be, that must be borne by the respondent as a result
of her failure to promptly decide after she was given a
second opportunity to take a sobriety test, which was
the case her.
The court's finding that there was a consent by
Mrs. Peterson, the respondent, to take the chemical test
requested by the trooper, and that said consent was not
rebutted, is not supported by the evidence or the law
and therefore this case should be reversed and remanded
on that ground.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that for the reasons
above stated in this appeal, the order of the trial court
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should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions for the trial court to revoke respondent's driving
privileges for one year.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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